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A pure exchange economy generates a “market game” in which the allocations 
achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its 
members. Subject to certain regularity conditions, it is shown that for a market 
game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the 
game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility 
of all consumers can be represented in the Gorman polar form. This is the class for 
which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer. 
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Game theorists like to work with transferable utility. In fact, several well- 
known solution concepts of game theory were, in their original formulations, 
defined only for games with transferable utility.’ Economists are uncom- 
fortable with transferable utility because it is not in general.possible to model 
a well-behaved exchange economy as a transferable utility game. It is known 
that in an exchange economy if preferences are of the quasilinear form, 
Uj(X, ,.-., x,> = x1 +fi(x, >‘.*3 x,,,), for all i, then there is transferable utility 
over a range of utility distributions.’ However, quasilinear utility implies that 
individual demands for all goods except one are independent of income. For 
many economic problems, this is not an attractive assumption. 
’ These include the Shapley value, the kernel, and the nucleolus. Shapley 1171 proposed an 
extension of the Shapley value concept to games without transferable utility. Roth 114) and 
Shafer [ 161 have argued that this extension is not in general an entirely satisfactory solution 
concept. (See also, Aumann’s response [3] to Roth and Shafer.) Kalai [ 101 has generalized 
the kernel and nucleolus to games without transferable utility. Important contributions have 
been made recently to the understanding of the extension of solutions to nontransferable utility 
games by Aumann [4], Kalai and Samet Ill]. and Hart 191. 
‘Kaneko [ 121, shows if there is quasilinear utility, then the utility possibility frontier is 
linear over some range. He defines there to be “transferable’ utility” whenever utility functions 
are of the form that we call “quasilinear.” In view of the results of our paper, it seems clear 
that this nomenclature is inappropriate, since quasilinear utility is sufficient but not necessary 
for “transferable utility” in the sense of game theory. For a simple treatment of the main 
properties of quasilinear utility functions, see Varian [ 19, Sect. 7.7.1) 
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The question of whether there are other, more economically interesting 
conditions which ensure that market games have transferable utility does not 
appear to have been satisfactorily answered in the existing literature. 
According to Lute and Raiffa [ 13, p. 1681, 
. utility is “unrestrictedly transferable” if . . . money exists, provided that each 
player’s utility for money is linear and that the zero and unit of each utility 
function is so chosen that conservation of money implies conservation of utility. 
When else it can realistically happen remains obscure. 
According to Shubik [ 18, p. 3611, 
Full transferability requires . . . that the money be a “u-money” in the sense that 
utility of each person in the chosen commodity be linear. 
In an interesting paper, Aumann [2] provides a partial solution. We discuss 
his result and compare it to ours in the Appendix to this paper. 
As it turns out, there are other kinds of preferences that allow market 
games to have transferable utility. An example is the case of identical 
homothetic preferences. To see this, consider the familiar “Edgeworth box” 
with two commodities and two trading consumers. If the two consumers 
have identical, homothetic preferences, it can be shown that the “contract 
curve” describing the set of Pareto efficient allocations is just the diagonal of 
the Edgeworth box. Stated algebraically, this means that the Pareto optimal 
allocations consist of all allocations obtained by giving some fraction ,4 of 
the aggregate endowment to one consumer and the fraction 1 -i of the 
aggregate endowment to the other. Since preferences are homothetic, they 
can be represented by a utility function that is homogeneous of degree one. 
For this representation of utility, it is then immediate that the utility 
possibility frontier is the simplex, ((u, , a,) > O( U, + u2 = u(w,, wJ), where 
oi is the aggregate initial endowment of commodity i. This argument 
generalizes to the case of many identical homothetic consumers and many 
commodities. The Pareto efficient allocations attainable by any coalition on 
its own are just those allocations in which each consumer receives a 
commodity bundle proportional to the total holdings of the coalition. Since 
preferences of all consumers can be represented by the same linear 
homogeneous utility function, the utility possibility frontier for any coalition 
is just the simplex of utility distributions generated by all possible propor- 
tional distributions of the coalition’s aggregate endowment. 
More generally, we will show that an exchange economy generates a game 
with transferable utility if indirect utility is of the Gorman polar form. (We 
define this class of utility functions below.) According to a standard result of 
consumer theory, this is precisely when aggregate demand is determined by 
prices and aggregate income, independently of income distribution.3 We also 
3 The original reference is German [7, 8). Further discussion is available in Blackorby. et 
al. 15 1, Deaton and Muellbauer [ 61. and Varian ( 191. 
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prove a converse result. If there is transferable utility in a neighborhood of a 
Pareto efficient allocation then it must be that in a neighborhood of the price 
vector that sustains this allocation as a competitive equilibrium, indirect 
utility is representable in the Gorman polar form. 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
We will deal with an exchange economy in which there is a set T of n 
consumers and where there are k commodities. In this paper we adopt the 
following notational conventions. Let x E RTk be an allocation. Then 
x = (Xl )...) x,), where xi E R: is consumer i’s commodity bundle and 
X=Xx, is the aggregate consumption bundle. We let u(x) = 
(%(X,),..., u,(x,>) E R” denote the utility distribution resulting from 
allocation x. A similar convention applies to allocations denoted y and z. 
Consumer preferences will be assumed to satisfy the regularity condition 
Condition P. Preferences of all consumers are reflexive, transitive, 
complete, continuous, strongly monotonic, and strictly convex over the 
nonnegative orthant R “, . 
Condition P implies that for each i there exists a continuous utility 
function ui(xi) representing i’s preferences over consumption bundles. An 
allocation x is unblocked by the coalition S if there is no other allocation y 
such that Ciss yi = CiEs xi and u,(y,) > ui(xi) for all i E S with 
ui( yi) > ui(xi) for some i E S. An allocation is Pareto optimal if it is 
unblocked by T, the set of all consumers. The utility possibility frontier for S 
generated by aggregate allocation X is the set W(S, X) of utility distributions 
for S which can be achieved by allocations x in which Cics xi =X and 
which are unblocked by S. 
There is global transferable utility if for some choice of utility functions 
representing preferences of each consumer and for every initial allocation x 
and coalition S, the utility possibility frontier for S generated by CieS xi is a 
simplex. Stated more formally, there is global transferable utility if for some 
choice of utility representations ui(x), there exists a real valued function 
WC Xl such that for all SC T and for all XERk,“, 
w(s, CisS xi) = {u > O 1.X ui = v(sY 2Iie.S xi> 1’ 
Even the strong assumption that utility is quasilinear is not enough to 
guarantee global transferable utility. In fact, as we will demonstrate, the only 
case in which there is global transferable utility is where preferences are 
homothetic and identical. Since there are interesting cases where there is not 
global transferable utility but where there is transferable utility over a 
substantial range of utility distributions, we find it useful to develop the 
weaker notion of “local transferable utility” at an allocation and in the 
neighborhood of an allocation. 
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Let x be a Pareto efficient allocation. There is local transferable utility at 
x if there is a neighborhood N, of u(x) in R” such that for all S contained in 
T, N, n W(S, X) = {u E N,l CisS ui = CisS ui(xi)}. There is local 
transferable utility around x if there exists a neighborhood N, of x such that 
there is local transferable utility at every Pareto optimal allocation in N,. 
Indirect utility functions are of the Gorman polar form if they can be 
written as v,(p, mi) = a(p) mi +/I,(p) for all i. It can be seen from 
application of Roy’s law that when indirect utility is of the Gorman form, 
demand functions are of the form xi(p, m,.) = a(p) m, + hi(p). Therefore all 
consumers have parallel linear Engle curves and hence aggregate demand is 
determined by aggregate income and the price vector, independently of 
income distribution. 4 
In the next section we assume that indirect utility is of the Gorman polar 
form for all price-income configurations that allow every consumer to 
purchase some bundle that he likes as well as his initial endowment wi. 
Formally this condition is stated as follows. 
Condition G. For each consumer i, let Ai = {(p, mi)(ui(p, mi) > ui(wi)}. 
For each i, indirect preferences on Ai can be represented in the form: 
“i(P? mi) = a(P) mi + Pi(P). 
2. GORMAN POLAR FORM IMPLIES TRANSFERABLE UTILITY 
A formal statement of this proposition is 
THEOREM 1. For an exchange economy with initial endowment w, if 
conditions P and G hold, then there exist utility representations for each 
consumer such that the portion of the utility possibility frontier corresponding 
to allocations which are Pareto superior to w is a simplex. 
Proof. Let x be a Pareto optimal allocation which is Pareto superior to 
o. According to the second theorem of welfare economics there exists a price 
vector p* $ 0 such that x is a competitive equilibrium at prices p*. Let 
M = {(m, ,..., m,) E R”ICmi =p*Cwi and ui(p*, m,) 2 ui(mi) for all i). 
Condition G requires that for m E M, ui(p*, mi) = a(p*) m, + /?,(p*) for all 
i and hence for m E M, Cvi(p*, mi) = a(p*)p*Co, + mi(p*). Since 
aggregate demand is independent of the distribution of income for all m in 
M, the allocation x(m) = (xl(p*, m,),..., xn(p*, m,)) is a competitive 
equilibrium and thus a Pareto optimum for all m in M. Therefore if m E M, 
the utility allocation u(x(m)) is on the utility possibility frontier. But 
4 This is a well-known property of the Gorman polar form. See, for example. Deaton and 
Muellbauer [6, Sect. 6.11, Varian [ 19, Sect. 3.161). 
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C”i(xi(mi>> = C”i(P*9 mi) = a@*) Cm; + u,(p*). Therefore the portion 
of the utility possibility frontier consisting of allocations that are Pareto 
superior to w must be the set {(ur,..., u,)IJ& = @*)@*&I~) + D&Y*) 
and ui > ui(wi) for all i}. This set is equivalent to a simplex under 
appropriate linear scaling of utility. I 
Theorem 1 can be applied to the subeconomy consisting only of members 
of S, where S c T. This enables us to claim 
COROLLARY. If Conditions P and G hold, then there exist utility 
functions such that for every S c T, the utility possibility frontier for S 
generated by CieS wi is a simplex over the range of utility distributions 
corresponding to allocations that are Pareto superior to o. 
3. TRANSFERABLE UTILITY IMPLIES GORMAN POLAR FORM 
(GLOBALLY AND LOCALLY) 
We will show that if there is global transferable utility for all aggregate 
initial endowments, then indirect utility must be globally of the Gorman 
polar form and that this, in turn, implies that preferences of all consumers 
are identical and homothetic. Thus we see that the assumption of global 
transferable utility implicitly imposes extremely strong restrictions on 
consumer preferences. But many of the interesting examples of transferable 
utility, including the case of quasilinear utility cited above, are cases where 
transferable utility does not apply globally, but only over certain domains. 
Some examples of this type are presented in the next section. Therefore we 
will find it useful to prove that “local transferable utility” implies that 
indirect utility is “locally of the Gorman polar form.” The proof of this 
result, which is Theorem 3, parallels the arguments used in Theorem 2 which 
establishes the global result. The latter proof differs from the former largely 
in the extra complications that are needed to keep track of neighborhoods. In 
the final section of the paper we show how these local results can be patched 
together to yield theorems on the implications of transferable utility over 
specified domains of the kind that appear in our examples. 
THEOREM 2. If preferences satisfy condition P and if there is global 
transferable utility, then indirect utility must be of the Gorman polar form for 
all positive prices and incomes. 
Proof: If there is global transferable utility, then for some choice of 
utility functions representing preferences, the utility possibility frontier, 
W(T, X) is a set of the form {u > 01 Cui = V(T, X)}. Convexity of 
preferences implies that the function V is quasiconcave in X. Therefore 
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applying the separating hyperplane theorem for convex sets and the 
assumption of strictly monotone preferences, we know that for any aggregate 
endowment X, there exists a vector of prices p %- 0 such that if 
V(II(T, X’) > V(T, X), then pX’ >pX. A continuity argument establishes the 
further conclusion that if V(T, X’) > V(‘(T, X), then pX’ > pX. Since every 
Pareto optimal allocation x, achievable with the aggregate endowment X, 
must satisfy the condition Cui(xi) = V(T,X), it follows that every such 
Pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium at the same price 
vector p. Letting vi(p, m,) be i’s indirect utility function, this implies that 
W(T, X) = {(v,(p, m,),..., vn(p, m,))(m, 2 0 for all i and Cmi =pX}. Since 
we also have W(T,X) = {u > O(Cu, = V(T,X)}, it must be that if m’ > 0 
and if Cm; = Cmi =pX, then Cvi(p, ml) = Cvi(p, mt) 
Consider an arbitrary price vector p $0 and an arbitrary income 
distribution m > 0. Let x(p, m) be the allocation in which xi(p, m) is 
consumer i’s demand at prices p and let X(p, m) = Cxi(p, m). Then since 
every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, it must be that Cvi(p, m,) = 
V(T, X(p, m)). From the result of the previous paragraph it follows that if 
Cm; = Cmi, then Cvi(p, m!) = Cvi(p, mi). Therefore there exists an 
“aggregate indirect utility function” u(p, Cmi) such that for all p $ 0 and 
m > 0, CUi(p, mi) = V(P, Cmi). This last equation when viewed as a 
function of m, for fixed p is known as a Pexider functional equation. 
According to a standard result in functional equations (Aczel [I I), it follows 
that there exist functions a(p) and pi(p) for all i such that 
vi(P5 mi) = a(P) mi + Pi(P)* I 
COROLLARY. If preferences satisfy Condition P and if there is global 
transferable utility, then preferences of all consumers must be identical and 
homothetic. 
Proof: If p % 0 and mi = 0 then the budget constraint implies that 
xi(p, mi) = 0. Therefore, if indirect utility of consumer i is of the form 
a(p) m, +pi(p) for all p 9 0 and m, > 0, then it must be that 
vi(p, 0) =pi(p) = ~~(0) for all p. Therefore p,(p) is constant over p. It 
follows that indirect utility can be represented simply by the function 
a(p) mi. But indirect utility is representable in this form for all i if and only 
if preferences of all consumers are identical and homothetic. (See, e.g., 
Deaton and Muellbauer [6, p. 1431) u 
THEOREM 3. Let preferences satisfy Condition P and let x* be a Pareto 
optimal allocation such that there is local transferable utility around x*. 
Then there is a price vector p* such that x* is a competitive equilibrium at 
prices p* with income distribution m* = (p*xT,...,p*x,*) and there is a 
228 BERGSTROM AND VARIAN 
neighborhood of (p*, m*) on which the indirect utility function of each 
consumer i is of the Gorman polar form. 
Proof: If there is local transferable utility around x*, then there is a 
neighborhood N,, of u(x*), a neighborhood N,, of X* and a function 
V(T, X) defined for all X in N,, such that for all X in N,,, the intersection of 
the set N, with the utility possibility frontier, W(T, X), is a set of the form 
{U E N~(CUi= V(T, X)}. C onvexity of preferences implies that V(T, X) is 
quasiconcave in X over the set N,, . By the same argument used in the proof 
of Theorem 2, for any allocation x such that u(x) E: N,, and X E N,, , there 
exists a vector of prices p such that x is a competitive equilibrium at prices p 
and such that every Pareto optimal allocation y for which u(y) E N,, and 
Y = X must be a competitive equilibrium at the same prices p. Therefore 
the intersection of N,, with W(T, X) is the set N,fl {(v,(p*, m,),..., 
vJp*, m,))(m, > 0 for all i and Cm, =p*X*}. 
Since x* is Pareto optimal, there exists a price vector p* such that x* is a 
competitive equilibrium at prices p* with income distribution m*, where 
m,? =p*xT for each i. Since preferences are assumed to be continuous and 
strictly concave, consumer demand functions and indirect utility functions 
must be continuous. Therefore it is possible to choose a neighborhood N, of 
P” and N,,, of m* such that if p E N, and m EN, then 
(v,(p, m,),..., vn(p, m,)) E N, and Cxi(p, mi) E N,, . From the results of the 
previous paragraph, it follows that there exists a function v(p, Cmi) from 
R n+, to R such that if p E Np and m E N,,,, then Cv,(p, mi) = v(p, Cmi). 
As in the proof of Theorem 2, this equation, viewed as a function of m for 
fixed p, is a Pexider functional equation. Without loss of generality, the 
neighborhood N,,, can be chosen to be a rectangular region. We can therefore 
apply the results of Aczel [ I] to assert that there exist real valued functions 
a(p) and pi(p) such that if p E Np and m EN,, then Vi(p, mi)= 
a(p) +/Ii(p) mi for all i. I 
As we have pointed out, when indirect utility is of the Gorman polar form, 
individual demand functions are all linear in income with parallel income 
consumption paths. Therefore aggregate demand depends only on prices and 
aggregate income, independently of income distribution. This enables us to 
conclude 
COROLLARY. If preferences satisfy Condition P and I$ there is local 
transferable utility around the Pareto optimal allocation x*, then there is a 
price vector p* such that xx is a competitive equilibrium at prices p* with 
income distribution m* = (p*x* , ,..., p*x$). For all prices and income 
distributions in a neighborhood of (p *, m *), individual demand functions are 
of the form xi(p, mi) = a(p) mi + b,(p) and in this neighborhood, aggregate 
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demand is determined by prices and aggregate income, independently of 
income distribution. 
4. SOME EXAMPLES OF “REGIONAL" TRANSFERABLE UTILITY 
In the previous section we showed that if there is global transferable 
utility, then preferences must be identical and homothetic. We also claimed 
that there are interesting cases in which there is not global transferable utility 
but there is local transferable utility over a significant domain of allocations. 
The following examples will establish this claim and lend some insight into 
the nature of “regional” transferable utility. 
EXAMPLE 1 (Quasi-linear utility). Suppose that there are two consumers 
and two commodities. Each consumer has a utility function 
ui(xil, xi*) = xii + 2&. The aggregate supply of each commodity is two 
units. A simple calculation shows that the sum of he two consumers’ utilities 
is maximized over the set of feasible allocations whenever xl2 = xZ2 = 1. Any 
distribution of the two units of good 1 together with this distribution of good 
2 yields the same sum of utilities and hence is Pareto optimal. Therefore at 
“interior” Pareto optimal allocations, where xi1 > 0 for i = 1, 2, the utility 
possibility frontier is locally linear. Movements along the frontier are 
achieved simply by redistributing good 1 in which both persons’ utility 
functions are linear. 
But there are other Pareto optimal allocations at which the utility 
possibility frontier is not “flat.” These occur at boundary Pareto optima 
where one consumer consumes none of good 1. For example, the allocation 
in which consumer 1 receives all of the good 1 and 1.5 units of good 2 is 
Pareto optimal. The only way to make a small transfer of utility from person 
2 to person 1 would now be for 2 to give 1 some good 2. Since neither 
consumer’s utility is linear in good 2, there will not be locally transferable 
utility at his allocation. In fact the utility possibility frontier in the 
neighborhood of this utility allocation can be shown to be described by the 
(nonlinear) equation U, = 2 + 2 dv. 
EXAMPLE 2 (Translated homothetic demand). Suppose that there are 
two consumers and two commodities. Each consumer has a bundle of 
“minimum requirements” such that for any bundle that exceeds minimum 
requirements, he has homothetic preferences on the excess over minimum 
requirements. Any commodity bundle that does not meet the minimum 
requirements is regarded as worse than any bundle that does. While the two 
consumers may have different minimal requirements, their preferences on the 
excess over minimal requirements are identical. For expository purposes, let 
us look at a particular case of this type. Let consumers 1 of 2 have minimum 
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requirement bundles r, = (1, 1) and rz = (0, 2), respectively. Let the two 
consumers have utility functions ui(xil , xi& = d= d= if xi > ri 
and ui(xi) < 0 otherwise. Let the vector of aggregate endowments be 
X= (3, 5). The set of Pareto optimal allocations in which both consumers 
are better off than they would be with their minimal requirements vectors is 
the set of all allocations in which x, = (1 + c, 1 + c) and x2 = (2 - c, 4 - c) 
for some c, where 0 <c Q 2. The portion of the utility possibility frontier 
corresponding to these allocations is the set {(u,, u2) > O/u, + u2 = 2). 
On the set {(p, mi)lpri < m,}, consumer i’s demand function can be 
shown to be xi@, mi) = a(p) mi + b,(p), where a(p) = (hi, &) and 
hi(p) = --@r,lp, ,pr,/p,). Substituting demand into the utility function, we 
find that ui(p, mi) = a(t)) mi + pi(p), where a(p) = l/(2 fi) and 
Pi(P) = -Pril(2VZK) f or all p and m, such that pri < mi. In this example, 
there is transferable utility at all allocations x for which ui(xi) > 0 for all i. 
Furthermore, for each consumer, demand is linear and indirect utility is of 
the Gorman polar form over the set of prices and incomes such that indirect 
utility is positive. 
5. TRANSFERABLE UTILITY IMPLIES GORMAN POLAR FORM 
(REGIONALLY) 
In this section we show that it is possible to “patch together” the local 
results of Theorem 3 in such a way as to show that local transferable utility 
over all points in certain regions implies that indirect utility is of the 
Gorman polar form over those regions. Our results are sufficiently general to 
apply to both Examples 1 and 2. 
LEMMA 1. Let preferences satisfy Condition P. Let p F 0 be a price 
vector and suppose that for some fixed income distribution m, and for all 
m s m, there is local transferable utility at the competitive allocation 
x(p, m). Then for all m %m, indirect utility of each consumer i can be 
represented in the Gorman polar form a(p) m, + b,(p). 
Proof: From Theorem 3 it follows that for any consumer i, if mf > mi, 
then there is an open interval containing m; such that for all mi in the 
interval, the indirect utility function of consumer i is of the form 
a(p) m, + hi(p). In order to prove Lemma 1, we must show that these local 
demand functions “tit together” to yield a single function of the same form 
over the entire half line {milmi > mi}. The only way that this could not 
happen would be if for some p, vi(p, m,) = a(p) m, + pi(p) for all m, in one 
interval and vi(p, mi) = a’(p) m, +/If(p) for all mi in some other interval, 
where a’(p) # a(p) or pi(p) # p;(p). Evidently these intervals would have to 
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be disjoint. Therefore it would have to be that the real interval {mi]mi > mi} 
could be partitioned into disjoint open sets. But this is impossible, since a 
real interval is a connected set. Therefore it must be that for everyp there are 
real numbers a(p) and pi(p) such that for all i and all mi > m, 
vi(PT mi> = a(P) mi + Pi(P). I 
THEOREM 4. Let preferences satisfy Condition P and let all goods be 
normal goods5 Let S c R”, let S’ = {xix $ y for some y E S} and suppose 
that there is local transferable utility around all Pareto optimal allocations x 
in S’. Then indirect utility is of the Gorman polar form for all consumers 
over the domain ((p, m))xi(p, mi) E S+ for all i}. 
Proof Let p be any price vector. Since all goods are assumed to be 
normal, the set of income distributions m such that xi(p, mi) E S+ for all i is 
a set of the form (ml m + m) for some m. From Lemma 1 it follows that for 
any p, there exist real valued functions a(p) and /3,(p) for all i such that if 
xi(PI mi> E s+ then Vi(P, mi) = a(p) mi + pi(p)* I 
APPENDIX 
It is interesting to compare our results with those of Aumann [2]. 
Aumann assumes that there is a single transferable private good and a set P 
of possible public outcomes. Each consumer i has a utility function of the 
form ui(xi, p), where xi is the amount of private good he receives and p is the 
public outcome. He considers the case where the set of utility distributions 
attainable by redistributing the private good while holding the public outcome 
fixed is contained in a simplex. Stated formally, Aumann’s condition is 
Condition A. For all p E P, if xxi = C yi , then C ui(xi, p) = C ui( yi , p). 
Aumann proves 
AUMANN'S THEOREM. If n > 3 and if ui(xi,p) is monotonic in xi for all 
p, then Condition A implies that for all i and all p E P, ui(xi,p) = 
c(p) xi + hi(p) for some functions c(p) and k,(p). 
’ A good is normal if demand is an increasing function of income. The theorem can be 
proved without this assumption, but the proof is intricate and seems barely worth the effort. It 
can be shown that under the other assumptions of the theorem, demand for any good must be 
either monotone increasing, monotone decreasing, or constant as a function of income for 
sufficiently large income. 
6 Aumann’s theorem requires there to be at least three consumers. We are able to dispense 
with this assumption because, unlike Aumann, we assume that there is local transferable 
utility not only at the “existing” aggregate endowment, but also at all “nearby” aggregate 
endowments. 
642 ‘35 ‘2.? 
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While Aumann’s theorem appears to be similar to ours, it is not really a 
theorem about transferable utility. Given Aumann’s other conditions, 
Condition A is, in general, neither necessary nor sufficient for the utility 
possibility frontier to be contained in a simplex. The reason is that, in 
general, the utility possibility frontier would be generated by simultaneously 
altering both the distribution of private goods and the public outcome. This 
observation was made forcefully by Samuelson [ 151 who pointed out that, in 
general, there is no single Pareto optimal amount of public goods. Different 
points on the utility possibility frontier are reached by changing the 
allocation of private goods and the amount of public goods. In the context of 
market games, Aumann’s public outcomes correspond to the competitive 
price vectors which sustain the Pareto optimal allocations. In general, this 
price vector cannot be assumed to be independent of the income distribution. 
As it turns out, we are able to proue that a market game has local 
transferable utility only if the sustaining price vector is independent of 
income distribution. 
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